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JUDICIAL EVASION AND DISINGENUOUS 
LEGISLATIVE APPEALS TO SCIENCE IN 
THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY 
Caitlin E. Borgmann* 
INTRODUCTION 
As John Rawls proclaimed, ―Justice is the first virtue of social 
institutions, as truth is of systems of thought.‖1 Justice and truth 
are pillars of the good society, and the courts play a vital role in 
ensuring both. The courts‘ primary responsibility is for the norms 
of justice, but implementing justice depends upon factual truth. 
Laws founded upon untruths subvert justice. Thus, when courts 
address laws that implicate individual rights like the right to 
abortion, they must ensure that these laws are based on a sound 
factual foundation. In the abortion context, the Supreme Court has 
increasingly shirked its duty to ensure both justice and truth. First, 
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court undermined the 
fundamental right to abortion by inviting laws premised on moral 
opposition to abortion. Yet its decision was dishonest, denying the 
conflict it created and purporting to leave the right to abortion 
intact; the decision has thus caused mischief and confusion in 
abortion regulation.
2
 Second, in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court 
shunned its responsibility for truth, signaling its readiness to grant 
extraordinary deference to disingenuous legislative attempts to 
                                                        
 * Associate Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law. B.A., Yale 
University; J.D., New York University School of Law. I am grateful for the 
opportunity to present an earlier version of this paper at the Brooklyn Law 
School Symposium, ―The ‗Partial-Birth Abortion‘ Ban: Health Care in the 
Shadow of Criminal Liability.‖ 
1 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (revised ed. 1999). 
 2 See infra notes 75–85 and accompanying text. 
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present morally based abortion restrictions as grounded in science.
3
 
Casey‘s muddled constitutional standard for abortion 
regulation has helped to subvert the integrity of legislative 
factfinding on abortion. Legislatures historically have sought to 
regulate abortion for reasons of ideology, not medicine.
4
 Under 
Roe v. Wade, this was not permissible, at least before viability.
5
 
The framework set forth in Roe allowed the state to restrict pre-
viability abortions only in order to further the woman‘s health. In 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
6
 the Court explicitly sanctioned the 
state‘s reliance on morality as the basis for abortion regulation.7 
Yet the decision, which upheld a woman‘s right to abortion, placed 
limits on how the state could express or implement its preference 
for childbirth. Accepting Casey‘s invitation, legislatures have 
enacted a wide variety of restrictions based on moral opposition to 
abortion. But, partly in response to the confusing legal standard set 
forth in Casey, they have felt compelled to disguise these moral 
viewpoints as scientific fact. 
The controversial nature of abortion, and the close tie between 
abortion regulation and the social movement against abortion 
rights amplify the unreliability of legislative factfinding on 
abortion issues. Since Roe v. Wade, opponents of the right to 
abortion have struggled to identify the most effective strategy for 
reigniting the public debate and winning over the hearts and minds 
of voters. The movement has sometimes determined that the right 
to abortion is best attacked indirectly and even deceptively.
8
 As the 
                                                        
3 See infra notes 48–70 and accompanying text. 
4 See generally JAMES RISEN & JUDY L. THOMAS, WRATH OF ANGELS: THE 
AMERICAN ABORTION WAR 8–20 (1998); see also Robert Post, Informed 
Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician 
Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 940–41 (discussing specifically ―informed 
consent‖ laws); Letter from James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson to ―Whom It 
May Concern‖ (Aug. 7, 2007) (on file with the author).  
5 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973). 
6 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
7 See id. at 876–78. 
8 See, e.g., Letter from Samuel B. Casey & Harold J. Cassidy to Members 
of the South Dakota Pro-Life Leadership Coalition at 2–3, 13 (Oct. 10, 2007) 
(on file with author). See generally Reva Siegel, The Right‟s Reasons, 57 DUKE 
L.J. 1641 (2008) (describing evolution of anti-abortion movement strategy post-
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social movement against abortion has evolved, legislation and 
legislative factfinding have mirrored its trajectory, often serving as 
the vehicle by which the movement implements its strategy. 
Gonzales v. Carhart (―Carhart II‖) only encourages this troubling 
trend.
9
 In Carhart II, the Court broke with its longstanding 
abortion precedents and gave broad deference to legislative 
factfinding on abortion.
10
 
As I have argued elsewhere, judicial deference to legislative 
factfinding is problematic, especially where important individual 
rights are at stake.
11
 This concern is sharply evident in the abortion 
context.  When courts defer to legislative factfinding on abortion, 
what results is an elaborate charade. Legislatures enact laws based 
on moral positions about pregnant women or the status of the 
embryo or fetus. Rather than make these moral underpinnings 
explicit, however, they present abortion restrictions as medical or 
health regulations. They then amass questionable legislative 
records to support these manufactured medical or health concerns. 
Recently, the Eighth Circuit joined the Supreme Court in deferring 
to such legislative factfinding.
12
 
In this Article, I discuss and critique legislative factfinding in 
the context of so-called ―informed consent‖ legislation, fetal pain 
laws, and ―partial-birth abortion‖ bans. I argue that courts neglect 
their responsibility for justice and truth when they defer to biased 
and unreliable legislative factfinding on abortion. The Article 
proceeds in two Parts. In Part I, I examine judicial deference to 
legislative factfinding, both generally and in the abortion context 
specifically. In Part I.A., I review the traditional justifications for 
judicial deference to legislative factfinding. In Part I.B., I describe 
the courts‘ historical treatment of legislative factfinding on 
abortion and argue that the Supreme Court‘s deference to 
congressional factfinding in Carhart II marked a dramatic 
                                                        
Roe). 
9 See infra text accompanying notes 49–71. 
10 See infra text accompanying notes 51–58. 
11 See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative 
Factfinding, 84 IND. L.J. __ (forthcoming 2008). 
12 Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc). See infra Part II.B. 
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departure from past precedent.   
Part II addresses the problematic nature of legislative 
factfinding in the abortion context. In Part II.A., I argue that 
Casey‘s formulation of the constitutional framework for abortion 
regulation has sown confusion and contributed to legislatures‘ 
tendency to disguise morally based abortion regulations as resting 
on science. In Parts II.B., C., and D., I discuss how ―informed 
consent‖ laws, fetal pain measures, and ―partial-birth abortion‖ 
bans, respectively, are disingenuously presented as justified and 
even motivated by science. I also criticize the courts for accepting 
and encouraging these insincere legislative appeals to science. I 
conclude the Article by arguing that courts should approach 
legislative factfinding on abortion with caution and skepticism, and 
that their duty to ensure justice in the abortion context carries with 
it a responsibility to seek the truth underlying abortion regulations. 
I.  JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO LEGISLATIVE FACTFINDING 
A. Justifications for Judicial Deference 
In discussing legislative factfinding on abortion, I refer to a 
particular category of facts commonly called ―legislative‖ or 
―social‖ facts. Donald Horowitz has defined social facts as ―the 
recurrent patterns of behavior on which social policy must be 
based.‖13 Social facts stand in contrast to ―adjudicative‖ or 
―historical‖ facts, which are the facts particular to the litigants and 
dispute before a court.
14
 When legislatures conduct factfinding in 
connection with proposed legislation, they examine social facts. 
Social facts overlap, but are not synonymous, with policy 
judgments. It is often said that courts should defer to legislative 
factfinding because legislatures are the appropriate institutions for 
policymaking. But even if legislatures should generally be solely 
responsible for making policy, this does not address the question of 
which institution should have the final say in determining the facts 
                                                        
13 See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 45 (1977). 
14 See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 43–62 (2008) (discussing fact classification and 
providing a taxonomy of constitutional facts). 
BORGMANN 4/27/2009  6:56 PM 
 JUDICIAL EVASION  19 
relevant to those policy choices.
15
 Another common but mistaken 
assumption is that deference to legislative factfinding tracks the 
levels of scrutiny applied in constitutional decisionmaking. Thus, 
many assume, courts applying rational basis review are highly 
deferential to legislative factfinding whereas, when applying strict 
scrutiny, courts independently review the facts.
16
 But the courts 
have not consistently followed this pattern and have sometimes 
deferred when strict or heightened scrutiny applies, and sometimes 
declined to defer where rational basis applies.
17
 Moreover, 
although the questions are related, how much deference to accord a 
legislature‘s factfinding is a distinct question from which legal 
standard to apply to the facts.
18
 
Although the Supreme Court‘s treatment of legislative 
factfinding is confused and incoherent, a recurring theme in the 
Court‘s decisions is that courts should defer to factfinding by 
Congress and state legislatures.
19
 This principle of judicial 
deference stems from two concerns.
20
 The first is a concern for 
institutional legitimacy and separation of powers. Because 
legislatures are the institutions invested with the authority to make 
policy, the Court has sometimes suggested that legislatures retain 
authority to decide the underlying facts as well.
21
 Thus, for 
                                                        
15 See Borgmann, supra note 11, at text accompanying note 43. 
16 See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 333 (1993) (stating that under 
rational basis review, courts must defer to factual assumptions underlying 
legislative rationale, even if they are erroneous); Indiana Democratic Party v. 
Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 844 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (suggesting that court‘s 
refusal to apply strict scrutiny to state voter identification law meant that court 
could not question state‘s factual justifications for the law (citing FCC v. Beach 
Commc‘ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)), aff‟d sub nom., Crawford v. Marion 
County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (2007); Am. Subcontractors Ass‘n v. City of 
Atlanta, 259 Ga. 14, 17 (1989). 
17 See Borgmann, supra note 11, at __ (citing cases). 
18 See id. 
19 See generally Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, 
Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941 (1999) (reviewing 
history of judicial deference). 
20 See Borgmann, supra note 11, at __ (discussing justifications for judicial 
deference to legislative factfinding). 
21 See HOROWITZ, supra note 13, at 25–26, 28–29; Saul M. Pilchen, 
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example, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the Court 
asserted: 
We owe Congress‘ findings an additional measure of 
deference out of respect for its authority to exercise the 
legislative power. Even in the realm of First Amendment 
questions where Congress must base its conclusions upon 
substantial evidence, deference must be accorded to its 
findings as to the harm to be avoided and to the remedial 
measures adopted for that end, lest we infringe on 
traditional legislative authority to make predictive 
judgments when enacting nationwide regulatory policy.
22
 
Judicial deference to legislative factfinding is also defended on 
the ground that legislatures possess greater capacity, or 
competence, in factfinding as compared with the courts.
23
 
Legislatures can draw on a broader range of resources, including 
the subpoena power and informal sources of information. They are 
more diverse than the judiciary and represent a broader array of 
viewpoints and backgrounds, thus fostering a better understanding 
of the social circumstances requiring legislative solutions. Because 
they control their own agenda, they are not reactive in the way 
courts are and can take a broader view of a given social issue. In 
Congress particularly, legislators can specialize, thus bringing 
individual expertise to bear in certain contexts, whereas judges 
                                                        
Politics v. The Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme Court Should Defer to 
Congressional Factfinding Under the Post-Civil War Amendments, 59 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 337, 365 (1984); see also Borgmann, supra note 11, at __ 
(summarizing arguments); B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make 
Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV 277, 
282 (2007) (same). 
22 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 196 (1997) (Turner II) 
(emphasis added). The ―harm to be avoided‖ is a factual inquiry whereas the 
―remedial measures‖ are a policy choice; in Turner II, the Court advocated 
deferring to both. 
23 See Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial 
Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1177–79 (2001); 
HOROWITZ, supra note 13, at 25–26, 28–29; Pilchen, supra note 21, at 365; 
Solove, supra note 19, at 1005–06; MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 68 (1999); see also Borgmann, supra 
note 11, at __ (summarizing arguments); Hill, supra note 21, at 282 (same). 
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tend to be generalists. 
Neither institutional concerns nor relative competence support 
judicial deference to factfinding in the abortion context.
24
 
Legislatures seeking to pass abortion restrictions do so for political 
and ideological reasons, reasons formed prior to any related 
factfinding and unlikely to be swayed by exposure to 
countervailing facts. Far from lacking institutional authority to 
review facts independently in such cases, the courts play an 
important constitutional role as a protector of individual rights 
from the tyranny of the majority.
25
   
Moreover, rather than enjoying superior factfinding 
competence, the legislative system is an inherently unfavorable 
setting for factfinding with integrity. As I have argued, 
Superior legislative factfinding competence is a chimera, 
especially when a legislature considers a proposal that will 
restrict individual rights in a controversial context. The 
problem is multi-layered. At the first level lie significant 
structural issues. Legislators are subject to political 
pressures beyond their control that are markedly different 
from those faced by courts, and these pressures profoundly 
affect the nature of legislative factfinding. The second level 
of difficulty is legislatures‘ frequent failure to seize 
whatever opportunities and advantages they do possess to 
conduct dispassionate and rigorous factfinding. Finally, the 
combination of these two problems impairs legislators‘ 
cognitive judgment, engendering mistakes in evaluating 
facts. Legislatures take non-facts for facts, or they dwell on 
                                                        
24 For a fuller critique of the principle of judicial deference to legislative 
factfinding in the context of individual rights, see Borgmann, supra note 11, at 
Part III. 
25 JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL 
PROCESS 68 (1980); see also FAIGMAN, supra note 14, at 175–76; Caitlin E. 
Borgmann, Legislative Arrogance and Constitutional Accountability, 79 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 753, 801 (2006); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for 
Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1706–08 (2008); Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Judicial Independence: The Situation of the U.S. Federal Judiciary, 
85 NEB. L. REV. 1, 13 (2006); Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1169, 1174 (reviewing MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE 
GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005)). 
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insignificant facts. These tendencies are exacerbated when 
legislators consider hot-button social issues . . . . Courts of 
course face their own obstacles in evaluating facts, and 
their factfinding is far from perfect. But in important cases 
they have proven to do a better job than the legislatures, 
justifying a reevaluation of deference to legislative 
factfinding in these contexts.
26
 
B. Courts‟ Treatment of Legislative Factfinding in the Abortion 
Context 
Until very recently, courts have not deferred to legislative 
factfinding in abortion cases.
27
 Rather, they have independently 
reviewed the relevant medical and other social facts implicated by 
abortion legislation. For example, just three years after Roe, in 
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
28
 the Court addressed a Missouri 
statute banning the saline amniocentesis method of abortion. The 
statute included a legislative finding that the method was 
―deleterious to maternal health.‖29 Rather than defer to this finding, 
the Court independently reviewed the facts and found that the 
safest alternative method—prostaglandin induction—was not 
readily available. Because saline amniocentesis was, at the time, 
the most common method of second-trimester abortions, the Court 
concluded it could not be banned.
30
 
 In Akron v. Akron Reproductive Health Services,
31
 the Court 
likewise refused to defer to the factfinding underlying challenged 
                                                        
26 Borgmann, supra note 11, at __ (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of 
the conditions that lead to biased factfinding in legislatures, see DAVID R. 
MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974); Laycock, supra 
note 25, at 1174–75. 
27 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Webster v. 
Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Akron v. Akron Reprod. Health 
Servs., 462 U.S. 416, 434–37 (1983); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 
52, 76–79 (1976).  
28 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75–76. 
29 Id. at 58. 
30 Id. at 78–79. 
31 Akron, 462 U.S. at 434–37. 
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abortion restrictions. Akron involved an ordinance that set forth a 
number of restrictions, including requirements for a mandatory 
delay and so-called ―informed consent,‖ hospitalization for all 
abortions performed after the first trimester, and either parental 
notice or parental consent for minors (depending on their age).
32
 
The ordinance contained several ―findings‖ that mixed medical 
assertions—including that abortion is ―a major surgical procedure‖ 
that should be performed only in a ―hospital or in such other 
special outpatient facility offering the maximum safeguards to the 
life and health of the pregnant woman‖33—with moral views—that 
―there is no point in time between the union of sperm and egg, or 
at least the blastocyst stage and the birth of the infant at which 
point we can say the unborn child is not a human life.‖34 
The Court cautioned that, while the state was permitted to 
regulate abortion in order to promote women‘s health, ―[t]he 
State‘s discretion . . . does not, however, permit it to adopt abortion 
regulations that depart from accepted medical practice.‖35 Thus, 
the Court declined to defer to Akron‘s finding that a hospitalization 
requirement promoted women‘s health. Instead, the Court 
reviewed evidence regarding the safety and availability of new 
abortion procedures, as well as professional opinions regarding 
hospitalization for abortion.
36
 The Court also examined the cost to 
patients of hospital abortions as compared with those performed in 
outpatient facilities.
37
 
Not all of the Justices agreed with the Court‘s failure to defer 
to the government‘s factfinding. Justice O‘Connor, in a dissenting 
opinion, at first seemed to acknowledge the inherent difficulties in 
legislative regulation of the details of medical practice. She 
suggested that it was unrealistic to expect that legislatures could 
―continuously and conscientiously study contemporary medical 
and scientific literature in order to determine whether the effect of 
a particular regulation is to ‗depart from accepted medical practice‘ 
                                                        
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 421 n.2. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 431. 
36 Id. 
37 See id. at 434–35. 
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insofar as particular procedures and particular periods within the 
trimester are concerned.‖38 Nevertheless, she argued for deference 
to legislatures‘ factfinding on abortion, asserting, ―Irrespective of 
the difficulty of the task, legislatures, with their superior 
factfinding capabilities, are certainly better able to make the 
necessary judgments than are courts.‖39 
Despite O‘Connor‘s admonition, the Court continued to ignore 
legislative factfinding in subsequent abortion cases. In Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services,
40
 the legislature had included, in an 
omnibus abortion bill, a ―finding‖ that ―[t]he life of each human 
being begins at conception.‖41 Far from deferring to this finding, 
the Court interpreted it to have no effect, noting that ―the preamble 
does not by its terms regulate abortion or any other aspect of 
appellees‘ medical practice‖ and concluding that it be ―read simply 
to express [a] value judgment‖ favoring childbirth over abortion.42 
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court wholly disregarded 
any legislative factfinding and instead reviewed the district court‘s 
findings concerning the effects of several challenged provisions 
including ―informed consent,‖ husband notification for married 
women, and parental consent for minors.
43
 The Court‘s deference 
to the district court‘s findings of fact on these provisions was 
admittedly uneven. It seemed to take seriously only the district 
court‘s findings on the effect of the husband notification provision, 
repeating in detail evidence of the social problem of family 
violence.
44
 It was less impressed with the district court‘s findings 
of fact on ―informed consent.‖ Yet even there, the Court purported 
to accept the district court‘s finding that the provision could result 
in delays and increased health risks to the woman and nowhere 
                                                        
38 Id. at 456 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting). 
39 Id. at 456 n.4 (emphasis added). 
40 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
41 Id. at 504 (referencing MO. REV. STAT. §§ 1.205.1(1)-(2) (1986)). 
42 Webster, 492 U.S. at 506. 
43 See 505 U.S. at 881–99. 
44 See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights 
After Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 678–700 (2004) 
(comparing Court‘s treatment of district court‘s factfinding on the various 
provisions challenged in Casey). 
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deferred to stated or implicit legislative findings regarding the 
provision‘s effects. Instead, the Court differed with the district 
court on the legal significance of its findings, concluding that the 
statute‘s predicted effects did not amount to an ―undue burden.‖45 
Similarly, although the Court in Casey did not even mention 
the district court‘s findings regarding the harmful effects of the 
parental consent provision, it upheld the provision not out of 
deference to the legislature‘s understanding of the facts, but rather 
because the Court had previously held such provisions to be 
permissible under Roe.
46
 Those earlier decisions themselves were 
based, not on deference to state legislatures, but on minimal 
factfinding by the district courts and, primarily, by a constitutional 
analysis that weighed a minor‘s right to end her pregnancy against 
countervailing interests including ―the importance of the parental 
role in child rearing.‖47 
The Court continued to disregard legislative factfinding in its 
2000 decision in Stenberg v. Carhart (―Carhart I‖),48 invalidating 
Nebraska‘s ban on so-called ―partial birth abortion.‖ In Carhart I, 
the trial court, Eighth Circuit, and Supreme Court all 
independently reviewed the facts underlying Nebraska‘s ―partial-
birth abortion‖ ban and did not even consider deferring to state 
legislative factfinding.
49
 But the Court‘s decision in Carhart II50 
marked a sharp change in its approach to legislative factfinding on 
abortion. In Carhart II, the Court credited dubious legislative 
factual assertions in order to justify a largely incoherent decision. 
 
                                                        
45 505 U.S. at 886. 
46 See id. at 899. 
47 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). 
48 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
49 See id. at 923–30; Stenberg v. Carhart, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999); 
Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507 (D. Neb. 1997). Similarly, courts 
considering the many other challenged state bans independently determined the 
facts without deferring to the legislatures. See, e.g., R.I. Med. Soc‘y v. 
Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288, 295 (D.R.I. 1999), aff‟d, 239 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 
2001); Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Miller, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (S.D. Iowa 
1998), aff‟d, 195 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1999); Eubanks v. Stengel, 28 F. Supp. 2d 
1024 (W.D. Ky. 1998), aff‟d, 224 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2000). 
50 Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
BORGMANN 4/27/2009  6:56 PM 
26 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
In Carhart II, the Court upheld the federal Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act of 2003, a ban nearly identical to the Nebraska 
ban struck down in Carhart I.
51
 Congress had attempted to 
distinguish its ban from the now-invalid state bans in part by 
inserting formal congressional findings into the statute. These 
findings included detailed assertions that the targeted procedure 
was ―not only unnecessary to preserve the health of the mother, but 
in fact pose[d] serious risks to the long-term health of women and 
in some circumstances, their lives.‖52 The findings also claimed 
that the procedure was a rogue method disfavored among abortion 
providers and not taught in medical schools.
53
 The government 
argued that the courts owed these findings deference. 
The Supreme Court‘s opinion first acknowledged the 
importance of judicial deference and, in the next breath, 
proclaimed its duty to review the facts independently because a 
―constitutional right‖ was at issue.54 Then, despite the 
demonstrably poor quality of Congress‘s factfinding,55 the Court 
implicitly deferred to Congress on the issue of whether the ban 
needed a health exception. The Court gave sufficient credit to 
Congress‘s factfinding to hold that there was medical disagreement 
as to the risks and benefits of the targeted abortion technique.
56
 
                                                        
51 See id. at 1619. 
52 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000). 
53 Id. (stating that the targeted method is a ―disfavored procedure‖ that is 
―outside the standard of medical care‖). 
54 See 127 S. Ct. at 1637 (asserting that ―we review congressional 
factfinding under a deferential standard‖ but that ―[t]he Court retains an 
independent constitutional duty to review factual findings where constitutional 
rights are at stake‖). 
55 See Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1019 (N.D. 
Cal. 2004) (―[T]he oral testimony before Congress was not only unbalanced, but 
intentionally polemic.‖); Brief of 52 Members of Congress as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood; Gonzales v. Carhart, 
127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (Nos. 05-1382, 05-380), 2006 WL 2736635, at 9–10 
(arguing that congressional ―findings‖ in the federal ban were drafted by the 
majority before additional hearings were held, and the subsequent testimony 
―was politically biased and transparently partisan, calculated to highlight 
testimony from supporters of the ban‖). 
56 See 127 S. Ct. at 1636. 
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Given this purported disagreement, the Court sided with Congress, 
determining that a health exception was not needed to render the 
act constitutional on its face: 
Considerations of marginal safety, including the balance of 
risks, are within the legislative competence when the 
regulation is rational and in pursuit of legitimate ends . . . . 
The Act is not invalid on its face where there is uncertainty 
over whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to 
preserve a woman‘s health, given the availability of other 
abortion procedures that are considered to be safe 
alternatives.
57
 
As David Faigman observes: 
In truth . . . this so-called medical disagreement was on the 
level of such scientific disagreements as evolution versus 
intelligent design and the reality of global warming. All 
three lower district courts agreed that there was, at least, ―a 
significant body of medical opinion‖ that the absence of a 
health exception carried significant health risks. The 
―scientific‖ debate over this procedure was largely 
manufactured by Congress, which had held highly partisan 
hearings on the subject and then concluded that a health 
exception was not necessary. Nonetheless, [Justice] 
Kennedy relied on this ―uncertainty‖ to support his 
conclusion that ―the Act can survive this facial attack.‖58 
In a dramatically dishonest portion of the opinion, the Court 
went out of its way to signal its approval of broad moral positions 
promoted by the anti-abortion movement, even as it pretended 
merely to articulate common-sense reasons for its relatively narrow 
ruling in the case before it. In an opinion supposedly addressing 
how abortions may be carried out, the Court suddenly waxed 
nostalgic about motherhood, proclaiming, ―Respect for human life 
                                                        
57 Id. at 1638; see also id. at 1637 (―Medical uncertainty does not foreclose 
the exercise of legislative power in the abortion context any more than it does in 
other contexts. The medical uncertainty over whether the Act‘s prohibition 
creates significant health risks provides a sufficient basis to conclude in this 
facial attack that the Act does not impose an undue burden.‖ (citation omitted)). 
58 FAIGMAN, supra note 14, at 60. 
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finds its ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has for 
her child.‖59 Attempting to tie this moral statement to the 
regulation of abortion, the Court implied that a woman‘s right to 
information was somehow at stake in the case. It suggested that the 
ban would protect a woman from a painful decision that she would 
later regret and stressed that it was important for women to be 
informed of ―the way in which the fetus will be killed.‖60 The 
passage seemed clearly intended to signal to legislatures the 
Court‘s willingness to accept future ―informed consent‖ legislation 
premised on the dubious factual claim that women experience 
emotional trauma following abortions.
61
 
The Court seemed not to care that medical authority had 
debunked the theory of a ―post-abortion syndrome,‖62 blithely 
admitting that ―we find no reliable data to measure the 
phenomenon‖ of post-abortion mental trauma.63 Further, it seemed 
to forget that the case was not about information but about whether 
a certain method could be banned altogether, so that a woman 
would never have access to it, much less hear a description of it. 
Justice Ginsburg‘s dissent condemned the Court‘s awkward 
invocation of ―an antiabortion shibboleth for which it concededly 
has no reliable evidence‖ to support a moral position ―that could 
yield prohibitions on any abortion.‖64 
Particularly noteworthy was the Court‘s reliance on an amicus 
brief containing testimonials against abortion that were also cited 
                                                        
59 127 S. Ct. at 1634. 
60 Id. 
61 Indeed, the Eighth Circuit recently issued an en banc ruling that was 
clearly influenced by the Supreme Court‘s acceptance of the mental trauma 
claim, quoting the Court‘s entire passage in its opinion. Planned Parenthood v. 
Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008). See infra Part II.B. 
62 See 127 S. Ct. at 1648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Post, supra note 4, at 
962–63. In fairness, the controlling opinion in Casey had also suggested that 
mental trauma might result from abortion if the woman were not ―fully 
informed.‖ 505 U.S. at 882; see also Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting 
Misinformation on Abortion: Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain 
Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 122, 122 & n.66 (2008). The Court did not 
cite a source for this statement in Casey. 
63 127 S. Ct. at 1634. 
64 Id. at 1647–48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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by a legislatively appointed, highly partisan South Dakota task 
force.
65
 The South Dakota legislature relied on the task force‘s 
factual findings in enacting a complete ban on abortions in South 
Dakota.
66
 Two anti-abortion lawyers who were architects of the 
South Dakota strategy acknowledged an implicit conversation 
between the South Dakota law‘s advocates and the Court on this 
point. They wrote that the South Dakota law and its defense in 
federal court have ―been litigated with an eye towards Justice 
Kennedy‖ (the author of the majority opinion in Carhart II) and 
that ―[i]t was not a coincidence that Justice Kennedy cited to [an 
amicus brief] which related the experiences of post-abortive 
women.‖67 
At a more general level, the majority opinion in Carhart II 
vividly displays the Court‘s complicity in factual gamesmanship 
by legislatures addressing abortion. The Court began its legal 
analysis by declaring that its central task was to ―determine 
whether the Act furthers the legitimate interest of the Government 
in protecting the life of the fetus that may become a child.‖68 But 
because a law that purports only to ban a single (and allegedly 
unnecessary) method of abortion can in no measure be said to 
―protect the life of the fetus,‖ the Court was forced to emulate 
Congress‘s contorted attempts to make the foot fit the slipper. The 
Court explained that the Act protected fetal dignity by fending off 
a ―coarsening‖ of the culture that would lead to widespread 
indifference to the lives of newborns and ―all vulnerable and 
innocent human life.‖69 The Act allegedly promoted this goal by 
―proscrib[ing] a method of abortion in which a fetus is killed just 
                                                        
65 See Siegel, supra note 8, at 1642–43; Post, supra note 4, at 966–68. 
66 S.D. HB 1215 (2006) (―[T]he Legislature finds, based upon the 
conclusions of the South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion, . . . [that] 
abortions in South Dakota should be prohibited.‖). The ban contained only a 
limited death exception for the woman. See id. It was ultimately repealed by 
voters. See Kaiser Daily Women‘s Health Policy Report, South Dakota Voters 
Reject State Abortion Ban (Nov. 8, 2006), available at http://www.kaiser 
network.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?DR_ID=40932. 
67 Casey & Cassidy, supra note 8, at 10, 12. 
68 Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1626. 
69 Id. at 1633 (quoting congressional findings). 
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inches before completion of the birth process.‖70   
This suggestion that the abortions at issue entailed killing full-
term babies about to be born was an utter falsehood. As the Court 
itself noted, the district court‘s injunction against the ban did not 
apply to fetuses who were viable (let alone to fetuses in the midst 
of being born).
71
 Justice Ginsburg bemoaned the Court‘s 
chicanery: 
Ultimately, the Court admits that ―moral concerns‖ are at 
work, concerns that could yield prohibitions on any 
abortion. Notably, the concerns expressed are untethered to 
any ground genuinely serving the Government‘s interest in 
preserving life. By allowing such concerns to carry the day 
and case, overriding fundamental rights, the Court 
dishonors our precedent.
72
 
Thus, in Carhart II, the Court was complicit in injustice in two 
ways. It failed to acknowledge how the limited ―moral concerns‖ 
Congress set forth in fact subverted the fundamental norm of 
protecting the right to abortion set forth in Casey and reaffirmed in 
Carhart I. Second, it shirked its duty to identify a sound factual 
basis for the law, accepting and echoing patently false assertions 
about the motives for the Act and about its medical implications. 
II. LEGISLATIVE FACTFINDING IN THE ABORTION CONTEXT 
A. The Problematic Nature of Legislative Factfinding in 
Abortion Regulation 
Legislatures are by their very nature prone to conduct 
tendentious, and therefore unreliable, factfinding to support 
proposed legislation.
73
 This tendency can be exacerbated by 
judicial deference to legislative factfinding, since legislatures who 
                                                        
70 Id. at 1632–33 (emphasis added). 
71 See id. at 1619 (―In 2004, after a 2-week trial, the District Court granted 
a permanent injunction that prohibited the Attorney General from enforcing the 
Act in all cases but those in which there was no dispute the fetus was viable. The 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.‖ (citation omitted)). 
72 Id. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
73 Borgmann, supra note 11. 
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expect that courts will defer to their factual findings will often try 
to package rights-limiting moral positions as factual claims.
74
 In 
the abortion context, the likelihood of unreliable factfinding is 
especially acute. Legislatures eager to pass abortion restrictions not 
only ignore countervailing facts, but both the Casey standard and 
the evolving strategy of the anti-abortion movement have led 
legislatures to design abortion laws that conceal their true purpose 
and then to embark on ―factfinding‖ that skirts the ideological 
basis for the laws. 
The unique nature of pregnancy and how the Casey Court 
formulated the constitutional standard for abortion regulation has 
likely contributed to the legislative propensity to present abortion 
restrictions as scientifically based. Nearly all abortion restrictions 
are, at bottom, driven by morality rather than science.
75
 But the 
Court‘s abortion decisions have sown confusion about how 
explicitly the government can base abortion regulations on purely 
moral underpinnings. The test that Casey established, on the one 
hand, endorsed states‘ taking a stance in the moral debate and 
conveying their stance to women. On the other, it seemed to 
require adherence to some sort of standard of truth and accuracy 
more suited to factual assertions than to moral opinions.  More 
fundamentally, it affirmed the constitutional right to abortion, 
which is squarely at odds with morally based laws designed to 
limit or ban abortion. 
 
                                                        
74 See id. at __ (citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205, 207 (1927) 
(deferring in part to ―the general declarations of the legislature‖ in finding that 
societal welfare would be promoted by sterilizing ―mental defectives‖); Suzanne 
B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and 
Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1965 (2006) (using Buck 
v. Bell to demonstrate the normative judgments underlying many ―factual‖ 
assertions by courts)); see also, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (including 
―findings‖ that ―the life of each human being begins at conception‖; that 
―[u]nborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being‖; and 
that ―[t]he natural parents of unborn children have protectable interests in the 
life, health, and well-being of their unborn child‖). 
75 See generally RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 4; see also Bopp & Coleson, 
supra note 4; Post, supra note 4, at 940–41 (discussing ―informed consent‖ 
laws).   
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In Casey, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the woman‘s right to 
abortion, but it also held that the state‘s interest in the embryo was 
compelling from the inception of pregnancy.
76
 The Court asserted 
that these interests ―do not contradict one another.‖77 This, of 
course, is nonsense: 
The strength of the state‘s interest in fetal welfare is 
inversely proportional to that of the woman‘s liberty. The 
Court could not expand Roe‘s recognition of the state‘s 
interest in the fetus into the pre-viability stage without 
placing the woman‘s liberty fundamentally at risk. . . . 
Apparently recognizing the hornets‘ nest into which they 
had stumbled, the joint opinion‘s authors attempted a fast 
exit, adding that ―the means chosen by the State to further 
the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the 
woman‘s free choice, not hinder it.‖78 
Permissible restrictions, the Court explained, were regulations 
―not designed to strike at the right itself‖ but those that ―do no 
more than create a structural mechanism by which the State . . . 
may express profound respect for the life of the unborn.‖79 
The Court was deceiving itself if it thought that such a law 
could really exist. In fact, there is no meaningful distinction 
between a law intended to make abortions harder to obtain and one 
intended to promote the state‘s preference for childbirth over 
abortion.
80
 As Justice Scalia pointed out in his Casey dissent, ―Any 
regulation of abortion that is intended to advance what the joint 
opinion concedes is the State‘s ‗substantial‘ interest in protecting 
unborn life will be ‗calculated to hinder‘ a decision to have an 
abortion.‖81 
                                                        
76 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
77 Id. 
78 Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights 
After Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 690–91 (2004) (footnotes 
omitted). 
79 505 U.S. at 877; see also id. at 878 (―[A] state measure designed to 
persuade [women] to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if 
reasonably related to that goal‖ and if it does not impose an undue burden.). 
80 Borgmann, supra note 78, at 692. 
81 505 U.S. at 987 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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By recognizing the state‘s interest in the embryo or fetus as 
compelling throughout pregnancy, Casey emboldened state 
legislatures to pass laws motivated by moral opposition to 
abortion. But these legislatures have also been mindful of Casey‘s 
caution that such laws may only incidentally burden access to 
abortion, and that any mandated information must be ―truthful and 
not misleading.‖82 Cautious or uncertain about the extent to which 
they can openly profess ideological grounds for abortion laws, the 
legislatures instead present abortion restrictions as rooted in 
medical and scientific concerns.
83
 This juxtaposition of science and 
morality is particularly vivid in the context of a recently upheld 
South Dakota ―informed consent‖ law. The Eighth Circuit en banc 
opinion showed extraordinary deference to the legislature‘s 
presentation of moral opinions as scientific fact.
84
 But even when 
restrictions are not about conveying information, legislatures seek 
to present them as supported, and even motivated, by science and 
medicine.
85
 
It is not hard to imagine what laws and legislative factfinding 
look like when a legislature is forthright about the ethical basis for 
a proposed law. If a legislature wants to prevent vandalism to 
buildings occupied by religious institutions, it enacts a ban on such 
behavior.
86
 The legislative hearing process is likely dominated by 
ethical concerns and presumably acknowledges the bill‘s moral 
impetus.
87
 To the extent the legislature delves into factfinding, it 
explores factual questions directly relevant to the law‘s the moral 
purposes. It may also use the factfinding process to rally moral 
outrage, perhaps by documenting the extent and heinousness of 
vandalism targeting religious institutions. Likewise, if a legislature 
believed abortions were immoral and openly sought to prevent 
them on this basis, its first step would be to propose a ban. In 
                                                        
82 Id. at 882. 
83 Siegel, supra note 8 (describing strategic shifts in social movement 
opposing abortion as responsible for abortion restrictions premised on women‘s 
emotional and physical well-being). 
84 See infra Part II.B. 
85 See infra Part II.C.–D. 
86 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 594.3 (2008). 
87 See id. 
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support of the ban, it would introduce evidence about the numbers 
of abortions and perhaps about the reasons women seek them. It 
might also try to demonstrate how effective its legislation would be 
in preventing abortions. It might even take a page from the book of 
some extreme anti-abortion-rights advocates, showing images of 
aborted fetuses or giving other information designed to raise 
discomfort over abortion.
88
 
But Casey and Carhart I and II tell legislatures that they may 
not unduly burden access to abortion, so bans are out of the 
question. Moreover, even restrictions short of a ban are subject to 
Casey‘s admonition that laws may not be ―designed to strike at the 
right itself‖89 and may impart only ―truthful, nonmisleading‖ 
information.
90
 It is unclear how this standard applies to laws rooted 
in moral opposition to abortion. Consequently, abortion rights 
opponents seem to feel obligated to hide the ball on abortion 
legislation.
91
 Abortion providers are targeted with onerous and 
discriminatory facility regulations purportedly in order to 
safeguard women‘s health and safety, when in fact the goal is to 
force clinics to shut down.
92
 ―Informed consent‖ regulations are 
allegedly designed to protect women‘s mental health, when in fact 
they endeavor to trick women through misleading and selective 
disclosures into rejecting abortion.
93
 Fetal pain measures 
supposedly aim to alleviate fetal pain during abortion, when in fact 
they are meant to provoke moral outrage against abortion by 
                                                        
88 These kinds of ―facts‖ often still find their way into legislative 
factfinding on abortion measures, but in a more cunning, indirect way. See infra 
Part II.B. 
89 505 U.S. at 877. 
90 Id. at 882. 
91 It is not Casey alone that has prompted the anti-abortion movement to 
repackage moral arguments against abortion as public health arguments. See 
Siegel, supra note 8, at 2 (detailing evolution of anti-abortion movement, 
including shift from moral arguments about the humanity of the embryo or fetus 
to public health arguments centered on abortion‘s alleged harm to women). 
92 See Bopp & Coleson supra note 4 (anti-abortion strategy memo, 
referring to benefits of ―‗incremental‘ efforts‖ to eliminate abortion, including 
―clinic regulations (which often shut down clinics)‖); Casey & Cassidy, supra 
note 8, at 7–8. 
93 See Post, supra note 4, at 940–41; infra Part II.B. 
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equating the fetus with a baby or child.
94
 In South Dakota, anti-
abortion-rights activists are gearing up for the ultimate conflation 
of science and morality on the issue of abortion; they intend to 
―prove‖ in legislative hearings, through scientific evidence, that a 
fetus is a person. They plan to do so first in the context of 
defending South Dakota‘s ―informed consent‖ law.95 But they see 
this law as merely a step toward the final goal: ―proving‖ the 
humanity of the fetus so that the Supreme Court has no choice but 
to overturn Roe.
96
 
B. “Informed Consent” Laws and “Proving” Fetal 
Personhood 
Casey‘s confusing directive to states on permissible abortion 
regulation seems most clearly to contemplate an ―informed 
consent‖ law. It seems straightforward enough that, under Casey, a 
state may enact a law expressing the state‘s preference for 
childbirth. But, of course, a law that requires women to hear 
simply that the legislature thinks abortion is immoral and prefers 
childbirth would not be very effective. As soon as legislatures 
attempt to go beyond such a bland statement, however, they butt 
up against Casey‘s ―truthful and not misleading‖ limitation.97 
Earlier generations of these laws required abortion providers to 
disclose or offer basic, ―neutral‖ information, such as the 
gestational age of the fetus and depictions of fetuses at various 
anatomical stages.
98
 Current versions require that women seeking 
                                                        
94 See infra Part II.C. 
95 See Casey & Cassidy, supra note 8, at 8 (predicting that a ―trial on the 
humanity of the child will likely take place in 2008‖ following the Eighth 
Circuit‘s en banc ruling). 
96 See id.; see also ChristianNewsWire, U.S. Appeals Court Decision 
Acknowledges Humanity of Unborn Child (July 3, 2008), 
http://christiannewswire.com/news/657267089.html. 
97 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992); see supra text 
accompanying notes 75–85. 
98 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2008); Akron v. Akron 
Reprod. Health Servs., 462 U.S. 416,  423 (1983) (describing ―informed 
consent‖ provisions of abortion ordinance). 
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abortions view, or at least be offered the opportunity to view, 
ultrasound images of their fetuses,
99
 or they require that doctors 
recite blatantly ideological statements on the state‘s behalf.100 
First-generation ―informed consent‖ laws sometimes also 
contained moral statements, but these seemed to acknowledge that 
positions on abortion are a matter of belief or conviction, not 
science. For example, an Illinois law required that doctors give 
patients printed materials about abortion that included the 
following statement: ―The State of Illinois wants you to know that 
in its view the child you are carrying is a living human being 
whose life should be preserved. Illinois strongly encourages you 
not to have an abortion but to go through to childbirth.‖101 This 
pre-Casey provision was invalidated,
102
 but it is not clear that 
Casey would forbid such a requirement as ―misleading.‖103 The 
law goes slightly beyond a bare recitation of the state‘s preference 
by asserting that the embryo or fetus ―is a living human being‖ 
(and a ―child‖), but it admits that this is the state‘s ―view,‖ 
suggesting opinions may differ. 
The tack recently taken by some legislatures in the current 
generation of ―informed consent‖ laws is to present similar moral 
―information,‖ but to clothe it in scientific or public health garb.104 
                                                        
99 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741 (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-
330 (2007); see also Daily Women‘s Health Policy Report, S.C. Legislature 
Approves Abortion Ultrasound Measure (Apr. 21, 2008), available at 
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/News2?news_iv_ctrl=-1&abbr=daily2_ 
&page=NewsArticle&id=11037 (discussing earlier version of South Carolina 
bill which required women to view ultrasound). 
100 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2008). 
101 Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 781 n.13 (7th Cir. 1980) (emphasis 
added). 
102 Id. at 775 n.2. 
103 Casey, 505 U.S. at 882. 
104 See Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 748 (2008) (Murphy, 
J., dissenting) (describing South Dakota law as requiring ―vague and ideological 
statements disguised as medical information‖); Siegel, supra note 8, at 1673 
(describing how anti-abortion activist David Reardon took moral objections to 
abortion rooted in ―the language of Christian love‖ and couched them ―as a 
concern about women‘s welfare expressed in the language of public health,‖ 
which would appeal more to ambivalent voters). 
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Thus, for example, when the South Dakota legislature enacted an 
―informed consent‖ measure, it included in the law a ―finding‖ that 
―all abortions, whether surgically or chemically induced, terminate 
the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.‖105 The 
statute required doctors to deliver a similar message to their 
abortion patients, namely ―[t]hat the abortion will terminate the life 
of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.‖106 While most 
would read this as an explicitly moral pronouncement, a South 
Dakota task force appointed by the legislature to investigate the 
effects of abortion characterized the assertion ―as a matter of 
scientific fact.‖107  
The South Dakota ―informed consent‖ law was immediately 
challenged in federal court.
108
 One of the plaintiffs‘ claims was 
that the statute‘s disclosure requirements violated physicians‘ free 
speech rights. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to 
prevent the statute from taking effect. Following the submission of 
evidence (which included facts from the legislative history) and a 
hearing, the district court granted the preliminary injunction based 
on the physicians‘ free speech claim.109 A divided panel of the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but the court granted a 
rehearing en banc.
110
 
While the en banc ruling was pending, two lawyers and 
architects of the South Dakota strategy
111
 described the Rounds 
case as addressing purely ―legal and factual issues,‖ including 
women‘s alleged regret after abortion and the ―humanity‖ of the 
embryo or fetus. In fact, they predicted, once the Eighth Circuit 
issued its en banc ruling, ―a trial on the humanity of the child‖ 
would follow.
112
 
                                                        
105 H.B. 1166, 2005 Legis. Assem., 80th Sess. (S.D. 2005). 
106 Id. 
107 SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, REPORT OF THE 
SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION 5 (2005), available at 
http://www.voteyesforlife.com/docs/Task_Force_Report.pdf. 
108 Rounds, 530 F.3d at 724. 
109 Rounds, 530 F.3d at 729 (summarizing district court‘s ruling). 
110 Id. at 730. 
111 See Siegel, supra note 8, at 1646 n.16. 
112 Casey & Cassidy, supra note 8, at 7–8. 
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The Eighth Circuit en banc ruling gave extraordinary deference 
to the legislature‘s blatant attempt to package a moral statement 
about when life begins as a scientific statement about embryonic 
genetics. It was important that the court accept the legislature‘s 
characterization of the question as scientific, because it interpreted 
Casey and Carhart II to forbid South Dakota to convey a purely 
moral viewpoint through physicians. As the court stated the test:   
[W]hile the State cannot compel an individual simply to 
speak the State‟s ideological message, it can use its 
regulatory authority to require a physician to provide 
truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient‘s 
decision to have an abortion, even if that information might 
also encourage the patient to choose childbirth over 
abortion.‖113 
The court found that the ―informed consent‖ law‘s mandated 
disclosure met this test: 
Once one accepts that the required disclosure must take 
into account the limiting definition in § 8(4), the evidence 
submitted by the parties regarding the truthfulness and 
relevance of the disclosure in § 7(1)(b) generates little 
dispute. The disclosure actually mandated by § 7(1)(b), in 
concert with the definition in § 8(4), is ―[t]hat the abortion 
will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living 
human being,‖ § 7(1)(b), and that ―human being‖ in this 
case means ―an individual living member of the species of 
Homo sapiens . . . during [its] embryonic [or] fetal age[],‖ 
§ 8(4).
114
 
The court assured that ―the biological sense in which the embryo 
or fetus is whole, separate, unique and living should be clear in 
context to a physician‖ and noted that ―Planned Parenthood 
submitted no evidence to oppose that conclusion.‖115 
To accept the South Dakota legislature‘s findings as scientific 
fact is to make the absurd suggestion that pregnant women do not 
know that the embryo or fetus they are carrying is of the human 
                                                        
113 Rounds, 530 F.3d at 734–35. 
114 Id. at 735. 
115 Id. at 736. 
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species.
116
 There is no other way to interpret the South Dakota 
findings on a scientific level—as science, the information 
conveyed is laughably obvious and unnecessary. Robert Post 
writes, ―It hardly seems plausible that a woman could be confused 
about whether she is carrying the biological fetus of a zebra, a 
raccoon, or a bat.‖117 If the information were presented with more 
scientific detail, it might impart information women do not 
typically know, but it still seems unlikely to affect a woman‘s 
abortion decision. For example, few women are likely to be 
deterred from obtaining abortions simply because they are told: 
Although the material messenger RNA initially present in 
the fertilized egg can provide the basic functions necessary 
to transcribe the [blastocyst‘s] DNA in the initial one or 
two cell divisions immediately following fertilization, these 
messenger RNAs are quickly degraded and lost after the 
first two rounds of cell division, and the housekeeping 
genes in the [blastocyst‘s] own DNA are transcribed into 
messenger RNA at that point. This newly synthesized RNA 
directs the program of global demethylation of genes so 
that they can be activated to replenish the functions lost 
after the degradation of the maternal RNA. Modern 
molecular biology has discovered that by the third cell 
division (long before implantation) all control of growth 
and development are established by the [blastocyst‘s] 
DNA. This means that immediately after conception, all 
programming for growth of the [blastocyst] is self-
contained.
118
 
It is only as a moral statement that the legislature‘s ―findings‖ 
become significant. The South Dakota legislature has a particular 
opinion about the moral significance of the scientific facts that it 
                                                        
116 See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Eighth Circuit to Pregnant Women: You‟re 
Not Carrying a Dolphin!, Reproductive Rights Prof Blog (June 28, 2008), 
available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/reproductive_rights/2008/06/ 
eighth-circui-1.html. 
117 Post, supra note 4, at 954. 
118 SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, supra note 107, at 
25. 
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wants the woman to hear.
119
 Pregnant women, given not the dry 
science quoted above but rather the statement required by the 
statute, will get a strong message from the state that the embryo or 
fetus is morally equivalent to a child, that the pregnant woman is 
already the ―mother‖ of that child, and that to proceed with the 
abortion would be to murder her own child.
120
 The Task Force 
Report noted, ―For women who believe that they have consented to 
the killing of a human being, the burden of guilt can be 
unbearable.‖121 The informed consent statute thus becomes a self-
fulfilling prophesy. Women are persuaded of the state‘s moral 
position, which leads those who have had abortions to suffer 
―unbearable‖ guilt, and this mental anguish must now be conveyed 
to women as part of the ―informed consent‖ process. 
The South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion continued and 
expanded the South Dakota legislature‘s efforts to transform moral 
pronouncements about abortion into scientific statements. The 
Task Force was established pursuant to a companion bill to the 
―informed consent‖ statute.122 The bill‘s mandate was wide-
ranging, directing the Task Force to study, among other issues, 
―the practice of abortion since its legalization‖ and ―the societal, 
economic, and ethical impact and effects of legalized abortion.‖123 
The Task Force thus picked up the themes of the factfinding 
conducted in support of the ―informed consent‖ law and laid the 
groundwork for a later law banning abortion in South Dakota 
entirely.
124
 The legislature relied heavily upon the Task Force‘s 
report in enacting the ban, which, in contrast to the ―informed 
                                                        
119 See Post, supra note 4, at 954–55. 
120 See id. at 958. 
121 SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, supra note 107, at 
43. 
122 Id. at 4; see also Siegel, supra note 8 (offering a detailed description and 
analysis of the South Dakota Task Force Report). 
123 HB 1233, 80th Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2005); SOUTH DAKOTA 
TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, supra note 107, at 5. 
124 HB 1215, 81st Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2006), See Kaiser Daily 
Women‘s Health Policy Report, supra note 66 (reporting on the overturning of 
South Dakota abortion ban by voter initiative); see also CASEY & CASSIDY, 
supra note 8, at 8–10 (describing South Dakota strategy). 
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consent‖ law, was intended to put the issue of overturning Roe 
directly before the Supreme Court.
125
 
Much of the Task Force‘s inquiry centered on whether a fetus 
is a ―human being.‖ The Task Force elicited scientific testimony 
describing the genetic structure of a human embryo, but its 
question to witnesses opposing the ban exploited the ambiguity 
between the superficially scientific question of genetics and the 
moral question that obviously motivated the entire project.
126
 
Confused, or suspicious of the Task Force‘s motives, these 
witnesses refused to answer.  The report notes, ―No credible 
evidence was presented that challenged these scientific facts [that 
the ‗human embryo and fetus is . . . a human being‘]. In fact, when 
witnesses supporting abortion were asked when life begins, not one 
would answer the question, stating that it would only be their 
personal opinion.‖127 
Although the Task Force deliberately melded scientific and 
philosophical questions about ―life,‖ it ironically accused Planned 
Parenthood of confusing the moral and scientific facts about when 
life begins: ―We find that Planned Parenthood has confused the 
objective biological fact that the procedure terminates the life of a 
human being with the moral, or value judgment of what respect or 
value should be placed upon the life of that human being.‖128 The 
Task Force repeatedly denied intending to attach any moral 
significance to its findings concerning the biological uniqueness of 
a human embryo.
129
 Yet the Task Force clearly intended that 
                                                        
125 See Evelyn Nieves, S.D. Abortion Bill Takes Aim at „Roe‟, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 23, 2006); Casey & Cassidy, supra note 8, at 2. 
126 See Post, supra note 4, at 957–58. 
127 SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, supra note 107, at 
12. 
128 Id. at 17. 
129 See, e.g., id. at 30. The Task Force parlayed other kinds of scientific 
―facts‖ into ethical edicts as well. For example, the Report condemned abortions 
in cases of rape or incest by quoting a pediatrician who testified that incest 
seldom leads to ―deformities.‖ He then recounted the story of a ―very young 
teenage mother‖ who was ―allegedly raped by her brother.‖ He lauded the 
―young lady‘s courage to choose life for her newborn son.‖ Id. at 32–33. Still 
other parts of the report were openly moral in nature. See, e.g., id. at 34 
(―[A]bortion is unethical and immoral and our support of it as a society wounds 
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women discern an ideological message in the supposedly 
―scientific‖ information.130 
Apart from its shrewd conflation of morality and science, the 
South Dakota Task Force‘s report dramatically demonstrates the 
dangers of relying upon ―scientific‖ findings legislatures make in 
the politically charged context of abortion. Although the Task 
Force heard from witnesses on both sides of the issue, it cherry-
picked those conclusions that fit its blatantly ideological agenda 
and conclusorily dismissed the others as noncredible. The 
witnesses the Task Force found the most credible were 
ideologically opposed to abortion. For example, several of the 
doctors it quoted were leaders in the anti-abortion movement.
131
 
The Task Force‘s findings regarding women‘s alleged regret after 
abortion were not based on credible evidence, as even the 
conservative majority on the Supreme Court has acknowledged.
132
 
The Task Force was also impressed with the testimony of 
―pregnancy help center personnel.‖133 The reliance upon 
―pregnancy help centers‖ seems innocuous, but in fact these 
centers are formed to dissuade women from having abortions and 
to perpetuate the myth that abortion causes post-traumatic stress 
disorder.
134
 Improbably, the Task Force described the testimony of 
                                                        
all of us.‖). 
130 See Post, supra note 4, at 957–58. The Task Force objected to the 
unadorned, factual information abortion providers currently do provide patients. 
This information includes the relative risks of childbirth and abortion, the 
relative safety of abortion procedures, and the fact that there is no credible 
evidence of long-term mental trauma from abortion. See SOUTH DAKOTA TASK 
FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, supra note 107, at 40–41. 
131 One doctor was Bernard Nathanson, a former pro-choice advocate who 
became an activist against abortion rights and created the famous anti-abortion 
film, ―The Silent Scream.‖ See SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY 
ABORTION, supra note 107, at 11–12. 
132 Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1634; see also Siegel, supra note 8, at 1689. 
133 SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, supra note 107, at 
19–21. 
134 See Post, supra note 4, at 940–41; United States House Of 
Representatives Committee On Government Reform — Minority Staff, Special 
Investigations Division, False And Misleading Health Information Provided By 
Federally Funded Pregnancy Resource Centers (July 2006) (prepared for Rep. 
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these witnesses as ―particularly credible because they are free of 
any conflict of interest‖ since they ―do not provide abortions.‖135 
The Task Force‘s factfinding was so biased, in fact, that the 
anti-abortion chair of the Task Force voted against its final 
report.
136
 She later campaigned against the South Dakota abortion 
ban, enacted on the heels of the Task Force‘s report, ―because, she 
said, the Task Force had opposed motions to restrict the evidence it 
accepted to ‗data that is consistent with current medical science 
and based on the most rigorous and objective scientific 
studies.‘‖137 
C. Fetal Pain Laws 
Fetal pain laws are a recently added component in several 
states‘ abortion-specific ―informed consent‖ laws,138 although 
some go further and require abortion providers to administer 
anesthesia to the fetus if the woman consents.
139
 Arkansas‘s law 
requires that women seeking abortions at twenty weeks or later
140
 
be offered printed materials about ―fetal pain.‖141 The materials 
include the statement: 
By twenty (20) weeks gestation, the unborn child has the 
physical structures necessary to experience pain. There is 
evidence that by twenty (20) weeks gestation unborn 
children seek to evade certain stimuli in a manner that in an 
infant or an adult would be interpreted to be a response to 
                                                        
Henry A. Waxman), available at http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=1080. 
135 SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION, supra note 107, at 
19. 
136 Siegel, supra note 8, at 1681. 
137 Id. 
138 See generally Tobin, supra note 62 (discussing and analyzing fetal pain 
laws in context of medical informed consent principles). Congress has also 
considered a fetal pain measure, the Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2006. 
See id. at 141 n.169. 
139 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1104 (2005). 
140 In Georgia, women must be offered similar information regardless of 
the stage of their pregnancy. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-9A-3, -4 (2006). 
141 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-1103, -1105 (2005). 
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pain. Anesthesia is routinely administered to unborn 
children who are twenty (20) weeks gestational age or more 
who undergo prenatal surgery.
142
 
The laws are presented as ensuring that women‘s decisions 
regarding abortion are fully informed, as well as to give the 
pregnant woman an opportunity to authorize or demand fetal 
anesthesia.
143
 Like the South Dakota ―informed consent‖ law, fetal 
pain measures are presented as reflecting value-neutral, scientific 
information. Arkansas‘s statute requires that ―the materials shall be 
objective, nonjudgmental, and designed to convey only accurate 
scientific information about the human fetus at the various 
gestational ages.‖144   
Far from reflecting concerns about fetal pain drawn from 
reliable scientific research, however, fetal pain laws are designed 
to make women feel troubled about ending the pregnancy by 
making women think of their fetuses as morally equivalent to 
babies. As a reporter observes, ―[I]t is clear that many of the anti-
abortion activists . . . have something more sweeping in mind [than 
preventing fetal pain]: changing perceptions of the fetus.‖145 The 
reporter further notes that ―[a]nother, perhaps intended, effect of 
fetal-pain laws may be to make abortions harder to obtain,‖ since 
many abortion clinics do not have the equipment or expertise to 
administer fetal anesthesia.
146
 
A strategy memo from prominent anti-abortion attorney James 
Bopp, Jr., confirms that the ultimate motive for the laws is not to 
alleviate fetal pain but to turn the public against abortion. The 
memo lists ―helpful legal changes‖ short of bans that will serve to 
―keep the abortion issue alive and change hearts and minds . . . 
translat[ing] into more disfavor for all abortions.‖147 The list 
includes ―statute[s] patterned after the proposed Unborn Child Pain 
Awareness Act‖ and ―statute[s] informing the woman seeking an 
                                                        
142 Id. § 20-16-1105(a)(1)(A). 
143 See, e.g., id. §§ 20-16-1103, -1104, -1105. 
144 Id. § 20-16-1105(a)(1)(B). 
145 Annie Murphy Paul, The First Ache, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 10, 2008. 
146 Id. 
147 Bopp & Coleson, supra note 4, at 6. 
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abortion that the unborn will experience pain.‖148 These statutes 
are expected to ―change hearts and minds‖ because the notion that 
a fetus can feel pain will make it seem more like a person: 
In their use of pain to make the fetus seem more fully 
human, anti-abortion forces draw on a deep tradition. Pain 
has long played a special role in how society determines 
who is like us or not like us (―us‖ being those with the 
power to make and enforce such distinctions). The capacity 
to feel pain has often been put forth as proof of a common 
humanity.
149
 
Like the South Dakota ―informed consent‖ law, fetal pain laws 
are designed to conceal their ulterior, ideological motives, 
purporting instead to reflect only neutral, scientific facts. As a 
commentator notes, ―The express purpose of [fetal pain measures] 
is to diminish the suffering that a fetus must endure as part of a 
post-20-week abortion. But the real purpose . . . is to discourage 
women from choosing an abortion by stressing that a 20-week-old 
fetus feels pain.‖150 
Legislative factfinding on fetal pain is not just problematic 
because it deceives the public about the legislation‘s true motives. 
It is also substantively unreliable. Although the laws purport to 
reflect scientific research showing that fetuses may experience pain 
after a certain stage of pregnancy, the scientific community is 
divided on this claim. Harper Jean Tobin argues that two out of 
three of the most commonly mandated statements on fetal pain 
―are questionable on the issue of truthfulness, and all are 
misleading.‖151 Most women would likely infer from these 
statements that fetuses can perceive pain and that anesthesia will 
alleviate that pain. The women are told nothing of the conflicting 
evidence concerning whether and when fetuses can perceive pain. 
                                                        
148 Id. at 9. 
149 Paul, supra note 145. 
150 Arthur Caplan, Abortion Politics Twist Facts in Fetal Pain Laws, 
MSNBC.com (Nov. 30, 2005), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id 
/10238840/ (The author is the director of the Center for Bioethics at the 
University of Pennsylvania.). 
151 Tobin, supra note 62, at 33–38. 
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Nor are they told that even physicians who do not believe fetuses 
perceive pain may nevertheless administer fetal anesthesia during 
prenatal surgery in order to make the surgery easier (by 
immobilizing the fetus and/or relaxing the uterus) and to improve 
surgical outcomes (by reducing the production of fetal stress 
hormones).
152
 
As Tobin explains, the research on fetal pain is at best 
inconclusive.
153
 Researchers and medical experts are sharply 
divided on the issue of fetal pain and the advisability of fetal 
anesthesia. Some believe that fetuses can perceive pain beginning 
around twenty weeks of pregnancy and that, even if this fact is 
uncertain, doctors should ―play it safe‖ by anesthetizing fetuses 
before abortion. Others object that, in the presence of uncertainty, 
a doctor ―playing it safe‖ should not anesthetize the fetus before 
abortion, since such a procedure increases the woman‘s health 
risks.
154
 
In a 1980 decision striking down an early fetal pain measure, 
the Seventh Circuit refused to defer to the legislature‘s assertions 
about the fetus‘s ability to perceive pain. Instead, it independently 
reviewed the facts and concluded, ―The uncontroverted medical 
testimony in the record at this stage describes this information as 
‗medically meaningless, confusing, medically unjustified, and 
contraindicated, causing cruel and harmful stress to patients.‘‖155 
Fetal pain measures may still be unconstitutional today, 
particularly if it can be proved that the information the legislature 
requires is either false or misleading.
156
 But this constitutional 
argument can succeed only if the courts refuse to defer blindly to 
legislative factfinding on fetal pain.
157
 
                                                        
152 Id. at 143; Paul, supra note 145. 
153 See Tobin, supra note 62, at 149. 
154 Paul, supra note 145. 
155 Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 784 (7th Cir. 1980). 
156 See Tobin, supra note 62. But see Antony B. Kolenc, Easing Abortion‟s 
Pain: Can Fetal Pain Legislation Survive the New Judicial Scrutiny of 
Legislative Fact-Finding?, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 171, 228 (2005) (arguing 
that fetal pain laws should be held constitutional). 
157 But see Kolenc, supra note 156, at 218–19 (arguing that judicial 
deference to legislative factfinding on fetal pain may be appropriate since ―facts 
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D. “Partial-Birth Abortion” 
Like ―informed consent‖ and fetal pain laws, ―partial-birth 
abortion‖ bans vividly demonstrate the dangers of judicial 
deference to legislative factfinding on abortion. The bans were 
conceived and promoted by advocates and politicians who oppose 
all abortions.
158
 Although they purported to be about a particular 
abortion procedure, they were intended to force the public to 
confront the details of abortion procedures, and thereby to turn 
public sentiment against abortion. The campaign to prohibit 
―partial-birth abortion‖ was thus part of an assiduously planned 
strategy to muster public outrage over abortion more generally.
159
 
The campaign to ban so-called ―partial-birth abortion‖ began as 
a collaboration between a National Right to Life Committee 
(―NRLC‖) lobbyist, Douglas Johnson, and Charles Canady, a 
right-wing Republican congressman from Florida.
 
The anti-
abortion-rights movement had failed to see Roe v. Wade 
overturned in the 1980s and early 1990s. In response to its decisive 
defeat in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the movement shifted its 
focus to passing incremental restrictions that would gradually 
undermine the core right to abortion. When Dr. Martin Haskell 
presented a lecture at a national conference of abortion providers, 
describing a new variation on the most common method of second- 
and third-trimester surgical abortions, Johnson and Canady seized 
upon it. They believed that the method was a perfect vehicle to 
provoke moral outrage at abortion generally. A description of this 
procedure would arrest the public‘s attention, in part because it 
was not so disturbing as to cause the public to avert its eyes. 
Johnson and Canady coined a deliberately incendiary term for 
                                                        
regarding fetal pain are best discovered using the processes normally seen as 
legislative strengths -- long investigations, evolving medical evidence, and a 
building of institutional expertise in a complex area‖). 
158 Brief for NARAL Foundation, et al. as Amici Curiae supporting 
Respondents, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
159 See Cynthia Gorney, Gambling with Abortion: Why Both Sides Think 
They Have Everything To Lose, HARPER‘S MAG., Nov. 1, 2004, at 33; Nadine 
Strossen & Caitlin Borgmann, The Carefully Orchestrated Campaign, 3 NEXUS 
3, 5–6 (1998). 
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Haskell‘s method, ―partial-birth abortion.‖ Pursuant to Johnson 
and Canady‘s plan, the NRLC circulated model legislation, along 
with strategic advice, to all of its state chapters. The state and 
federal bans that followed were thus a product of this carefully 
orchestrated public relations campaign.
160
 
As part of the campaign, line drawings purporting to depict the 
targeted procedure were developed specifically to make the fetus 
appear as a newborn infant. As a recent anti-abortion strategy 
memo acknowledged, ―The PBA drawings set before the public 
showed a developed baby, capable of life outside the womb, within 
inches of birth, being slaughtered by a stab in the skull and the 
suctioning of its brains. People were shocked out of their lethargy 
and flawed beliefs.‖161 In fact, the intact D&E162 variant of D&E 
abortions is often used in the second trimester of pregnancy, well 
before fetal viability.
163
 
The point of the drawings, however, was not to engage in a 
medically accurate public dialog about abortion procedures. 
Rather, it was to fuse abortion and infanticide in the public 
consciousness. In a memo the NRLC distributed to its state 
chapters nationwide,
164
 Johnson acknowledged the bans‘ true 
purpose. Far from reflecting a considered, public response to a 
medically questionable procedure, the bans were intended to draw 
pro-choice advocates into discussions centering on how abortions 
are performed. The memo advised: 
When someone attacks the definition as ―unclear‖ or as 
overly sweeping, simply keep reading the definition and 
asking, ―What part of this is not clear? Please describe in 
detail the procedures that you want to do that you believe 
                                                        
160 Strossen & Borgmann, supra note 159, at 26 (footnotes omitted). 
161 Bopp & Coleson, supra note 4, at 5. The Supreme Court adopted this 
depiction of the procedure as performed upon full-term babies.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 68–69. 
162  ―D&E‖ stands for ―dilation and evacuation,‖ the most common method 
of abortion after the first trimester of pregnancy. See Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 924. 
―Intact D&E‖ is a variant of this procedure and is also sometimes referred to as 
―D&X.‖ Id. at 927. 
163 See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 4, at 5. 
164 See Amicus Brief of NARAL Foundation, et. al., supra note 158. 
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would be banned by this definition.‖ Generally, the pro-
abortion side quickly drops this discussion, as it serves 
mainly to focus the discussion on the grisly mechanics of 
late term abortions.
165
 
In contrast to recent ―informed consent‖ laws and fetal pain 
measures, ―partial-birth abortion‖ bans were openly moral in 
purpose.
166
 But the real moral purpose, to advance a future ban on 
all abortions, was not legally acceptable. Nor were the bans 
reasonably related to that goal, since they purported to ban only a 
single procedure. ―Partial-birth abortion‖ thus became a decoy in 
the battle to win over the public. Advocates narrowed the moral 
goals, allegedly aiming only to protect the dignity of the fetus and 
to promote the integrity of the medical profession.
167
 Yet even 
these goals could be pursued only insofar as the bans did not 
unduly burden the right to abortion.
168
 If the bans endangered 
women‘s health, they would impose an undue burden.169 In order 
to prove that the bans could be constitutional even without a health 
exception, legislatures had to appeal to medical ―facts.‖ They had 
to demonstrate that the targeted method was medically 
questionable (i.e. not widely accepted by the medical 
establishment) and of little to no medical benefit, or even 
affirmatively dangerous, to women.
170
 
Anti-abortion advocates therefore portrayed the procedure as a 
rogue method that was invented more for physicians‘ convenience 
than women‘s safety and wellbeing.171 They suggested that a fetus 
                                                        
165 Id. at 17 (quoting memo) (emphasis added). 
166 See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 
2000); Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1633. 
167 See 18 U.S.C. § 1531; Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 930–31. 
168 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 837. 
169 See Carhart I, 530 U.S. at 931; Borgmann, supra note 44. 
170 Legislatures did not attempt to defend the premise regarding fetal 
dignity, probably because a comparison to other procedures would inevitably 
have failed to show why intact D&E was any more of an affront to fetal dignity 
than other available procedures. 
171 See, e.g., Illinois Right to Life Committee, Partial Birth Abortion Ban: 
In Depth, http://www.illinoisrighttolife.org/PartialBirthAbortionBan.htm 
(―[T]he procedure itself is dangerous and solely for the convenience of 
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aborted through this procedure could be born and could survive if 
only the physician did not kill it first.
172
 They gave dramatic 
accounts of risks the procedure allegedly carried.
173
 They claimed 
that banning the procedure would not harm women because 
alternative methods were just as safe or safer.
174
 Ultimately, none 
of this ―factfinding‖ had anything to do with the real impetus for 
the bans. As Judge Richard A. Posner wrote, dissenting from a 
Seventh Circuit decision addressing two state ―partial-birth 
abortion‖ bans: 
The statutes do not seek to protect the lives or health of 
pregnant women, or of anybody else. . . . Any general 
health regulation is likely to hurt a few people. But as 
banning ―partial birth‖ abortions is not intended to improve 
the health of women (or anyone, for that matter), it cannot 
be defended as a health regulation.
175
 
Moreover, if the legislature were concerned about women‘s 
health, Posner pointed out, it is unclear why it failed to include a 
health exception: 
Tomorrow, studies may show that, yes, there indeed are 
cases where a ―partial birth‖ abortion is necessary to 
protect the mother‘s health, as many physicians believe. 
Tomorrow, then, these two statutes may be unconstitutional 
even by the lights of the majority opinion. Why would a 
state risk the early obsolescence of its statute by making it 
wholly dependent on ever-changing medical opinion, when 
to avoid this risk it need only have excepted those ―partial 
birth‖ abortions, if any, that are necessary to protect the 
woman‘s health?176 
The NRLC exercised remarkable influence over the legislative 
                                                        
abortionists.‖). 
172 See Bopp & Colseson, supra note 4, at 5. 
173 See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 153 (findings 
section). 
174 See id. 
175 Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 878 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., 
dissenting). 
176 Id. at 880. 
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process of enacting the ―partial-birth abortion‖ bans, drafting, 
promoting, and lobbying vigorously for their passage.
177
 The 
advocacy group controlled how the bans were worded, 
―instruct[ing] legislatures in State after State on how to resist 
limiting or clarifying the scope of so-called ‗partial-birth‘ abortion 
legislation.‖178 The strategy was so successful that ―all the States 
that enacted such legislation in 1996, 1997, or 1998 adopted 
language substantially similar to the model legislation espoused by 
the NRLC.‖179 Judge Posner lamented the partisan quality of the 
legislative response: 
The wave of ―partial birth‖ abortion statutes that broke over 
the nation after a description of the D & X procedure was 
publicized does not exhibit the legislative process at its 
best, whatever one thinks of abortion rights. Whipped up 
by activists who wanted to dramatize the ugliness of 
abortions and deter physicians from performing them, the 
public support for the laws was also based . . . on sheer 
ignorance of the medical realities of late-term abortion.
180
 
Indeed, the state and federal legislative hearings on the 
―partial-birth abortion‖ bans more closely resembled boisterous 
town hall meetings more sober, thoughtful inquiries into the 
relevant facts. Testimony often included wild accusations and 
virulent condemnations of abortion generally (comparing it to the 
Holocaust, for example).
181
 Witnesses typically included members 
of advocacy groups and interested citizens. There was little 
testimony from doctors. In Arizona, the witnesses who testified in 
a 1997 hearing on H.B. 2191 were typical of those who appeared 
in other state legislatures.
182
 They included a staff member of the 
Arizona Catholic Conference, a lawyer and another staff member 
from Planned Parenthood, the Executive Director of Arizona Right 
                                                        
177 Brief of NARAL Found. et. al., as Amicus Curiae supporting 
Respondent, supra note 158, at 17. 
178 Id. at 18. 
179 Id. 
180 Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 880 (citations omitted). 
181 See Borgmann, supra note 11, at __. 
182 See, e.g., id. at __ (describing testimony before Alaska Legislature). 
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to Choose, a woman who described her own tragic pregnancy that 
necessitated an intact D&E, two representatives of the Center for 
Arizona Policy (a conservative advocacy group), a Reverend of the 
Church of Christ, and two interested citizens. In addition, fifteen 
members of the public ―want[ed] to have their opposition to H.B. 
2191 noted for the record but [did] not wish to speak.‖183 
Allowing interested members of the public to express their 
views on a controversial topic may serve a worthy purpose in a 
legislative hearing. But it is not an effective mechanism for 
educating the legislature about the facts. Yet the state legislatures 
seemed to rely on the testimony of non-medically-trained 
advocates for the relevant medical information. For example, a 
representative of Arizona Right to Life testified that the ban‘s 
description of the targeted procedure did not encompass other 
procedures and ―questioned the idea of this method being a life-
saving procedure.‖184 In Alaska, 
[c]ommittee members directed many medically related 
questions to one of the Alaska Civil Liberties Union 
representatives, who repeatedly reminded the committee 
that she was not a physician. The sole doctor to testify was 
not able to speak to all of the relevant medical issues, since 
he did not himself provide abortions. The lone citizen to 
testify against the ban asked the committee whether any 
doctors in Alaska performed the targeted procedure, but 
none could answer that question.
185
 
Congress‘s hearings were not much better. In fact, fifty-two 
members of Congress signed onto an amicus brief that attacked 
Congress‘s factfinding on the federal ―Partial Birth Abortion Ban 
Act.‖ The brief noted that detailed congressional ―findings‖ were 
inserted into the new version of the ban before any hearings on the 
                                                        
183 Partial-birth Abortions; Prohibition: Hearing on H.B. 2191 Before the 
Gov‟t Reform & States‟ Rights Comm., 43rd Leg., 1st Sess. 8 (Ariz. 1997) (on 
file with author). 
184 Id. at 7. This witness also submitted a transcript of the congressional 
testimony of Brenda Pratt Shafer, a nurse who claimed to have worked for Dr. 
Haskell and to have witnessed him performing three intact D&E procedures and 
who described in detail what she had allegedly seen. 
185 Borgmann, supra note 11, at __. 
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new version were held, and that ―[t]he Congressional hearing that 
followed the drafting of the Findings was politically biased and 
transparently partisan, calculated to highlight testimony from 
supporters of the ban.‖186 
In contrast, the court proceedings on the state and federal bans 
played out very differently. ―Free of the advocacy-oriented rhetoric 
that punctuated the [legislative] hearings, the parties enjoyed the 
comparative luxury of a fair process and the court‘s serious 
attention to the factual issues.‖187 When courts declined to defer to 
legislative factfinding, as virtually every court did until the 
Supreme Court‘s decision in Carhart II, they invalidated the bans 
with near uniformity.
188
 In Carhart II, it was the Court‘s solicitude 
toward Congress‘s judgments regarding the health effects of the 
federal ban that enabled the Court to uphold it.
189
 
CONCLUSION 
Legislative factfinding will inevitably be a mixture of morality 
and science. The normative context in which legislative decision-
making occurs shapes the very questions that are asked and the 
way those questions are answered.
190
 This, however, means that 
courts must approach legislative factfinding cautiously and 
skeptically. To the extent an issue like abortion does raise 
empirical scientific questions (Can we know whether a fetus is able 
to perceive pain? Do abortions cause post-traumatic stress 
                                                        
186 See Brief of 52 Members of Congress as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 10–11, Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood Fed‘n of Am., 127 S. 
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190 See FAIGMAN, supra note 14, at 178–81; Rebecca Bratspies, The Role of 
Trust in Regulatory Systems (draft on file with author); see also Suzanne 
Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1957 
(2006) (making a similar point regarding judging). 
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disorder?), courts should conduct an independent review to ensure 
that the facts are driving the moral conclusions and policy choices, 
and not the other way around. A court may defer to a legislature‘s 
policy decision to respond to a given set of facts in a particular 
way (assuming that to do so does not violate constitutional rights). 
But if it turns out that the facts are not as the legislature portrayed 
them, then the policy decision itself is called into question. 
Sometimes moral influences are subconscious. But often they are 
not, and yet they are unacknowledged or even obscured for 
political reasons. This undermines healthy decision-making at both 
the legislative and judicial levels.
191
 While it would be impossible 
completely to segregate science and morality in factfinding, the 
integrity of the decision-making process will only be improved if 
ideological influences are explicitly acknowledged.
192
 
In the abortion context, recent decisions by the Supreme Court 
in Carhart II and the Eighth Circuit in Rounds have taken the 
opposite approach. Faced with legislation and legislative 
factfinding clearly orchestrated so as to conceal the true 
ideological impetus for the laws, each court rewarded this 
obfuscation.
193
 Each accepted questionable ―scientific‖ conclusions 
and then found that these conclusions justified the laws. In Carhart 
II, the Court admitted that Congress‘s factfinding was shoddy, yet 
favored it over the thorough factfinding of both district courts 
below.
194
 Even more remarkably, it appeared to send a message to 
state legislatures, encouraging them to continue their biased 
factfinding on abortion, and to lower courts, urging them to 
defer.
195
  In its en banc opinion in Rounds, the Eighth Circuit 
                                                        
191 Cf. Goldberg, supra note 190 (arguing that greater judicial candor 
regarding the normative underpinning of court decisions will improve theories 
of judicial review). 
192 See id. 
193 I assume that the legislators knew of or were complicit in the long-term 
plan underlying the South Dakota ―informed consent‖ laws and the ―partial birth 
abortion‖ bans. But if they were misled by anti-abortion advocates, this only 
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195 See supra text accompanying notes 57–59. 
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accepted the invitation wholeheartedly, participating in the South 
Dakota legislature‘s farce.196 
It is one thing for legislatures to engage in biased factfinding; it 
is quite another for courts to repeat the phenomenon. We may be 
willing to accept that politically influenced legislators will engage 
in advocacy-oriented ―factfinding.‖ But we can tolerate this system 
only so long as we can rely on the federal courts to protect against 
its harmful effects.
197
 Blind judicial deference sidesteps this critical 
role of the courts, reproducing the legislatures‘ disingenuous 
factfinding at the Supreme Court level and embedding it into the 
Court‘s abortion jurisprudence. This is especially troubling 
inasmuch as the Court, once it finds certain medical facts, tends to 
view those as fixed by stare decisis.
198
 Far worse than a 
legislature‘s enactment of a misinformed statute, which can always 
be repealed or judicially invalidated, judicial deference leads to 
long-term, legal recognition of politically motivated, unreliable 
factual claims. 
There is another troubling aspect to the courts‘ acceptance of 
legislatures‘ attempts to repackage ideologically motivated 
restrictions as grounded in science and public health. Jessie Hill 
has argued that the Court‘s jurisprudence on medical decision-
making has proceeded on two separate tracks—a public health 
model and an autonomy model.
199
 The autonomy model is more 
protective of the right to make medical treatment decisions, and 
traditionally the Court has analyzed abortion regulations under this 
paradigm.
200
 To the extent that legislatures cast abortion regulation 
as less about morality and more about science and medicine, the 
Court may find reason to shift more to the public health model, 
under which health regulations are subject only to rational basis 
review.
201
 There were already hints of this in Carhart II, where the 
                                                        
196 See supra text accompanying notes 102–11. 
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Court combined the undue burden standard with language echoing 
rational basis review.
202
 
When legislatures jeopardize important individual rights, 
courts have a duty to step in to implement the norms of justice.
203
 
This ―profound obligation‖204 carries with it a responsibility for 
factual and scientific truth in implementing those norms. In the 
context of abortion restrictions, the Supreme Court has failed on 
both of these fronts. In Casey, the Court invited legislatures to base 
abortion restrictions upon moral norms that directly conflict with 
the right to abortion. Yet it refused to acknowledge this conflict 
and the extent to which it undermined the fundamental right 
declared in Roe. The Court‘s prevaricating confused the legislative 
landscape on abortion, prompting legislatures to pass laws based 
on moral opposition to abortion while disingenuously presenting 
them as scientifically based. In Carhart II, the Court made plain its 
willingness to tolerate this legislative disregard for factual and 
scientific truth in regulating abortion.  In so doing, it shirked its 
primary constitutional responsibility to protect individual rights 
and promote justice, as well as its subsidiary responsibility for 
truth. 
 
                                                        
202 See Carhart II, 127 S. Ct. at 1633. Professor Hill describes Carhart II as 
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